Independent Agencies and Removal Protection

Independent agencies are typically led by multimember boards or commissions whose members serve fixed, staggered terms, with a limit on how many can come from one party, and who can be removed by the President only for cause, usually defined as inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The design aims to insulate decisions about elections, financial markets, labor disputes, and monetary policy from short-term political pressure. Examples include the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, the FTC, the FCC, the FEC, the NLRB, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The Supreme Court upheld for-cause protection for FTC commissioners in Humphrey's Executor v. United States in 1935, reasoning that the agency exercised quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Later decisions narrowed that holding. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB in 2010 struck down two layers of for-cause protection, Seila Law v. CFPB in 2020 struck down protection for a single agency director, and Collins v. Yellen in 2021 did the same for the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The Court has repeatedly signaled that the Federal Reserve, with its distinct history, may stand on different footing.

In 2025 the President removed commissioners at the NLRB, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the FTC, and other agencies without cause, and the Supreme Court allowed most removals to take effect while litigation continued. On June 29, 2026, it ruled 6 to 3 in Trump v. Slaughter that the FTC's removal protection is unconstitutional and overruled Humphrey's Executor. The same day, in Trump v. Cook, it refused to let the President remove a Federal Reserve governor without notice, a chance to respond, and a reviewable basis, describing the Fed's independence as an arrangement sanctioned by history. Supporters say the rulings restore accountability to elected leadership, while defenders of independent agencies warn that expert regulators will now answer to political pressure.